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Abstract
It is well-known that damages to a victim’s psyche can 
occur due to witnessing or being victim of the traumatic 
event(s), and this was first recognised in ancient Greece1. 
However, it took centuries for this to be recognised by 
the common law. It originated within the concept of 
nervous shock which was first introduced by the Coultas2 
case through negligence in the duty of care. Before the 
Supreme Court of Victoria (Australia), the jury awarded 
damages for the shock which, however on a further 
appeal, the Privy Council held that the damage was too 
remote. This decision opened a door which was not shut 
until the present time: the strict relatedness between the 
physical and psychological injury and the recognition 
of psychiatric damages for recovery in the absence of 
physical injury. 
There is no doubt that the Alcock3 case has been 
considered as a “test case” for last two decades which 
shows all dilemmas and differences in endorsement of 
psychiatric damages within the English law of tort. This 
case certainly reflected the scepticism and uncertainty 
in acknowledging psychological injury and in some 
court cases, ignorance of medical opinion, or the courts’ 
concerns about “opening the floodgates” to limitless 
or unrestricted liability and its ramifications for the 
insurance industry, or inherent problems of establishing a 
1 Historian Herodotus wrote that during the battle of Marathon in 
490 BC, an Athenian soldier who suffered no wounds became blind 
after witnessing the death of the soldier next to him. Achilles and 
Agamemnon, military heroes in the Homer’s Iliad, also suffered 
trauma symptoms.
2 Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas (1886) 12 VLR 895.
3 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1992) 1 AC 310.
causative link, or imposing administrative and/or practical 
difficulties of psychiatric damages to produce a long-term 
protection to the mental tranquillity. 
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secondary victim; Impairment; Complex trauma; 
Dissociation
Zepinic, V. (2015). Fear of the “Floodgate of Liability” and 
Acknowledgment of the Recognisable Psychiatric Damage Into 
English Law of Tort. Canadian Social Science, 11(4), 1-14. Available 
from: http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/6704 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/6704
1.  INTRODUCTION
More than a century after first time being acknowledged 
in Coultas, psychiatric damage has caused many 
controversies in the English law of tort, but steadily 
increasing knowledge of the effect on the human 
psyche (in particular to the suffering of post-traumatic 
stress disorder) have gradually widened the ambit of 
recovery for psychiatric damage. There is no doubt that 
mental illness is still a cause of stigma for those who 
have suffered, as well as society at large. In law, some 
judges stigmatise the use of psychiatric damage as it is 
“misleading and inaccurate”, on the proviso that it is 
understood to refer to the psychiatric illness which results 
from emotional stress, and not the emotional stress itself4. 
For example, in the Relly5 case the Court of Appeal found 
that the fear, chest pain, panic and discomfort, vomiting, 
sleeplessness, nightmares, and claustrophobia, which 
4See: Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 per 
Widneyer J at 394; Jaensch c Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 per 
Brennan J at 560; Attia v British Gas Plc (1988) QB 304 per Dillon 
LJ at 311; Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992) 
1 AC 310 per Parker LJ at 351.
5 Relly & Relly v Merseyside Regional Health Authority (1995) 6 
Med LR, 249.
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an elderly couple (plaintiffs) suffered over a two month 
period due to the negligently maintained hospital lift, 
was a “normal emotion in the face of a most unpleasant 
experience, for which it was the sound policy of the law 
not to provide compensation” (?). Whereas in principle 
even minor physical injury will be entitled to recovery, 
the negligent infliction of purely emotional harm, such 
as post-traumatic stress, anxiety, depression, or phobia, 
recognisable and diagnosable in medicine quite often is 
not considered under the law of tort.
The merits of psychiatric damages within the law of 
tort have been debated repeatedly and in particular about 
certain trauma circumstances which cause psychiatric 
illness. However, there is a discernible shift away from 
focussing on psychiatric damages in the law of tort 
since the McLaughlin6 case. In recent years, interest 
in psychiatric damage in the English law of tort has 
been heightened by the widespread media coverage of 
high-profile cases, in particular after the disaster at the 
Hillsborough football stadium with 96 people being 
killed7.
Historically, the English law of tort began to develop 
during the thirteenth century, covering a wide range of 
wrongdoings such as trespassing and various forms of 
liability for trespassing which required the wrongdoing 
to be direct but no actual damage or injury was required. 
The law of tort limited its engagement with emotional 
distress being preoccupied with physical injury and social 
disorder. The law needed to prove damage which must 
be visible or demonstrable with physical manifestation 
as a prerequisite of liability. The “injury to feelings” had 
been identified in terms of insult and affront rather than as 
emotional distress, and mental illness was not conceived 
in biological or psychological terms. In same court cases, 
emotional distress was seen as “parasitic” to the physical 
injury under the umbrella of “pain and suffering”. Mental 
pain was seen as legally unquantifiable and unfocused in 
the law’s conception of remediable emotional harm. 
In an attempt to find an applicable approach in this 
area, it is necessary to be conscious that in common 
law relation to liability for psychiatric damage is still 
developing. In the past, the courts awarded recovery 
for the various medical conditions such as morbid 
depression, hysterical personality disorder, pathological 
grief disorder, and also a chronic fatigue syndrome. 
However, the medical evidence should establish that the 
plaintiff has suffered a recognisable psychiatric illness, 
as the ordinary emotions of anxiety, fear, apathy, sadness, 
restlessness, or transient shock are not conditions which 
6 McLaughlin v O’Brian (1983) 1 AC 410.
7 See: The Times 29 March 1995, The Guardian 29 March 1995, The 
Independent 29 March 1995 and the Daily Mail 30 March 1995. 
The Times 1 November and 12 December 1996, The Guardian 1 
November and 12 December1996, The Independent 1 November 
1996 and 19 February 1997, The Sunday Times 25 May 1997, and 
The Evening Standard 12 December 1996.
the law recognises for recovery. When assessing the 
test of foreseeability in a psychiatric damage as a result 
of an injury or fear of injury to another person, it is 
first necessary to consider whether psychiatric damage 
is reasonably foreseeable, and whether the defendant 
assume that the plaintiff is a person of “customary 
phlegm” and has “a normal standard of susceptibility”. 
Where danger lies in this particular infirmity is that 
it would include a dependence of all circumstances, 
and also the rule of remoteness, so that the susceptible 
plaintiff may recover to the full extent of the psychiatric 
damage. The second point about the psychiatric damage 
is the consideration of ex past facto in the light of what 
had happened—having immediate or delayed impact 
upon the victim’s psyche.
2.  FEAR, PAIN AND SUFFERING THAT 
“CONSTITUTE” PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS
In Dulieu v White & Sons8 it was stated (Kennedy J) 
that liability for the psychiatric damage is limited by a 
requirement that there “must be a shock which arises from 
a reasonable fear of personal injury to oneself”. Accepting 
fear as a symptom (or syndrome) of psychiatric illness 
would deliver difficulties in both medicine and the law of 
tort. In the law of tort, it will preclude liability to someone 
who merely witnesses, even purposely, the traumatic event 
or the injury of another person. The obitur dictum from 
Dulieu case was rejected in Hambrook v Stokes Bros9 
where the defendants were held liable for a fatal nervous 
shock suffered by a person who watched as a driverless 
runaway lorry careered down a hill. The court dismissed 
the restrictions of liability proposed in the Dulieu case due 
to the following terms:
It would result in a state of the law in which a mother, shocked 
by fright for herself, would recover, while a mother shocked by 
her child being killed before her eyes, could not, and in which 
a mother traversing the highway with a child in her arms could 
recover if shocked by fright for herself, while if she could be 
cross-examined into an admission that the fright was really for 
the child, she could not.
The Dulieu case brought about a number of questions 
in regard to witnessing the traumatic event. One of the 
most sensitive is the duty that arises when the witness has 
no relationship with the injured or person in danger, and 
what sort of relationship is required to endorse psychiatric 
damage. A further question posed is whether it should 
make any difference if psychiatric illness arose not from 
the perception or the eye witnessing of a traumatic event, 
but by being a subject of information about it after the 
event. Initially, all of these and similar questions should 
be considered under a big umbrella of foreseeability 
8 Dulieu v White & Sons (1901) 2 KB 669.
9 Hambrook v Stokes Bros (1925) 1 KB 141.
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which test will vary according to, first of all, the precise 
description of what should have been foreseen and, 
secondly, the degree of probability which makes it 
foreseeable10.
The question of foreseeability has also been explored 
in Palsgraf11, a famous and well-know American case 
which considered the risk of suffering a psychiatric illness 
due to witnessing a traumatic event. The New York Court 
of Appeal rejected the claim on the grounds that the 
plaintiff was owed no duty because it was not foreseeable 
that the allegedly careless acts of the guards could create a 
risk of harm to the plaintiff:
Negligence is not a tort unless it results in the commission of a 
wrong, and the commission of a wrong imports the violation of 
a right, in this case, we are told, the right to be protected against 
interference with one’s bodily security. But bodily security is 
protected, not against all forms of interference or aggression, but 
only against some.
The above statement is controversial as everyone owes the 
duty of care to refrain from an act that may unreasonably 
threaten the safety of others, or risk another’s safety. On 
the one hand, in everyday life, the risk of safety is evident 
and occurs, however those who have a duty of care must 
take reasonable actions to avoid wrongdoing or harm, and 
avert the threat to safety. On the other hand, those who 
are aware of risk or danger to life should take reasonable 
action to escape or find a way as to not put themselves 
into a dangerous zone. Harm to someone as a result 
of natural circumstances (i.e., flooding or earthquake) 
cannot be seen as someone’s negligence in duty of care. 
If individuals take unreasonable risk despite warnings 
from the authorities of forthcoming natural disaster, the 
consequences upon them cannot be taken in tort for the 
sustained harm.
This makes consideration of the “proximity” between 
a victim and defendant (authority or individual) in regard 
to the plaintiff’s injury. In the Palsgraf case, the concept 
of “proximity” was not seen as the concept of “duty”. 
In another way, it appears that a man ought not to be 
responsible for unforeseeable consequences: 
(As) there was no duty to her, it seems she would have had 
no remedy even in this case, but of course if it had happened 
it would have been held that she was near enough to have an 
interest.
However, the “proximity” cause in the Palsgraf has been 
highly criticised for its controversial decision. The first 
thing to clarify whether fear is a symptom or syndrome of 
psychiatric illness is to examine the nature of the trauma 
in question. Obviously it would be enough if one had been 
shot or blown up - that is a traumatic event. Fear is coherent 
cognitive-affective structure located within the defensive 
motivational system and a sense of uncontrollability 
10 See: Hoffman LJ in Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd 
(2007) UKHL 39.
11 Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad (1928) 162 NE 99 (NY).
focused largely on possible future threat, danger, or other 
potentially negative events12.
However, there is naturally much more to it. It is 
difficult to believe that a very frightening event(s) or 
situation(s) would not produce an immediate bodily 
response. The longer a trauma continues, the more an 
individual would break down. Thus, a negative-affective 
state is accompanied by a shift of attention which is 
primarily self-focused or a state of self-preoccupation 
where one’s (inadequate) capabilities have to deal with 
the threat/danger/risk which cannot be taken as another’s 
carelessness. Regardless of the individual’s experiencing/
suffering severe psychological or somatic components 
due to known or ordinary fear (i.e., fear of terrorism 
attack, nuclear war, etc.), from a medical point of view, 
the fear itself does not constitute a recognisable (even 
it is still diagnosable) psychiatric illness applicable for 
recovery in the law of tort. This means that the fear as an 
emotional condition could be taken into consideration as a 
“pre-conditioning” for a recognisable psychiatric illness. 
Unlike in medicine where fear is seen as one’s emotional 
condition regardless of the cause (relatedness), in the law 
of tort there is a distinction between the same clinical 
conditions: fear for own safety and fear for the safety of 
another (“proximity”).
As stated in Hambrook v Stokes Bros, it was held 
that a plaintiff outside the zone of danger could recover 
from shock caused by fear for the safety of others, which 
is highlighted by: (a) the presence at the scene of an 
accident, and (b) the perception of danger (as opposed 
to being informed by someone else). These elements of 
physical proximity to time and place are the emphasis 
of the relationship between the plaintiff and the primary 
victim; it also determines whether the psychiatric damage 
is foreseeable in the circumstances of an accident.
In Chaster v Council of Municipality of Waverly13, 
a mother suffered from psychiatric damage through 
seeing the body of her son recovered from a water-filled 
trench. It was found that the council who left the trench 
unprotected owed her no duty of care in preventing the 
cause of her son’s injury. Certainly, the outcome would 
have been different if she was present at the time when 
her son suffered injury. In King v Phillips14, a mother who 
heard a scream looked out of the window and saw her son, 
as she thought, disappear under the wheels of a taxi. She 
was not awarded damages because it was not foreseeable 
12 V Zepinic, Exposure therapy of panic disorder using support 
person (AABCT, 1997); See also: DH Barlow, (ed.), Anxiety and Its 
Disorders, (The Guilford Press 2002); CA Courtois, (ed.), Treating 
Complex Traumatic Stress Disorder (The Guilford Press 2009); MJ 
Friedman, (ed.) Handbook of PTSD (The Guilford Press 2007); MJ 
Horowitz, Stress Response Syndrome (Jason Aronson Inc. 2001); 
H Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm (Hart Publishing 
2009); O van der Hart, (ed.) The Haunted Self (WW Norton 2006). 
13 Chaster v Council of Municipality of Waverly (1939) 62 CLR 1.
14 King v Phillips (1953) 1 KB 429.
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that she might be watching from such a position and 
suffers psychiatric damage.
However, the courts have on many occasions held 
that it was foreseeable that a plaintiff not present at the 
scene of the accident but who arrived shortly afterwards 
(“aftermath doctrine”) should be awarded recovery for 
damages. One of the first was the case of Boardman v 
Sanderson15, where father and son accompanied a friend to 
the garage to collect a car. The father left his son outside 
and went into the garage office. The friend while taking 
the car outside the garage negligently ran over the son’s 
foot. The father heard his son screaming and immediate 
ran to his son. The court found that the defendant knew 
the father was nearby and could foresee that in such 
circumstances he would immediately come to the scene of 
the accident. 
In an Australian case of Storm v Geeves16, the potential 
from the Boardman case was extended: A child was 
run over by a truck and killed while waiting for a bus 
close to her home, and her mother suffered shock and 
consequently psychiatric damage due to the sight of her 
daughter’s crushed body. The court held that she should 
be rewarded recovery because it was foreseeable that the 
circumstances would bring her to the site of the accident. 
In the Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey17, the plaintiff was 
quite close to where the accident took place, heard the 
explosion and went to the scene to assist in the rescue but 
suffered psychiatric damage as a result of the shock.
The ‘aftermath doctrine” received its full endorsement 
by the House of Lords in McLaughlin v O’Brian, in which 
the plaintiff did not go to the scene of the accident, but to 
the hospital, where she saw injured members of her family 
still covered in mud and oil, and crying and screaming. 
Lord Wilberforce reported: 
As regard proximity to the accident, it is obvious that this must 
be close in both, time and space… Experience has shown that 
to insist on direct and immediate sight or hearing would be 
impractical and unjust and that under what might be called the 
“aftermath doctrine”, one who, from close proximity, comes 
very soon on the scene, should not be excluded.
The “aftermath doctrine” was accepted outside UK, 
and indeed extended, by the decision of the Australian 
High Court in the Jaensch v Coffey18 case. In this case, 
the plaintiff went not to the scene of the accident but 
to the hospital where her seriously injured husband 
had undergone surgery and was in critical condition. 
She stayed at the hospital for a long period of the day, 
witnessing the condition her husband had suffered, and 
a few days later it was evident that she had sustained 
psychiatric illness. In delivering judgement, Deane J 
stated that the “aftermath doctrine’ was accepted as 
15 Boardman v Sanderson (1964) 1 WLR 1317.
16 Storm v Geeves (1965) Tas SR 252.
17 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR p.383.
18 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR p.549.
it was not necessary to look at the immediate point of 
impact: 
… the aftermath of an accident encompasses at the scene 
after its occurrence, including the extraction and treatment of 
the injured. In a modern society, the aftermath extends to the 
ambulance taking an injured person to hospital for treatment 
and to the hospital itself during the period of immediate post-
accident treatment.
However, the “aftermath doctrine” accepted in the 
Jaensch v Coffey case was challenged in another 
Australian case Spence v Percy19. Here it was stated 
that the Deane J’s inclusion of the ‘aftermath doctrine” 
was quite inappropriate, as it represented no further 
meaning than the conclusion of the existed ‘immediate 
post-accident treatment”. Similar to the Spence v Percy, 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Rhodes 
v Canadian National Railway20 case gave a narrow 
construction to the theory of causal proximity and doubted 
utility in determining either foreseeability or causation. In 
the Australian case Annetts v Australia Stations Pty Ltd21, 
the ‘aftermath doctrine” was tested in regard to perceived 
perception about the event. Annetts concerned psychiatric 
injury suffered by parents on hearing of the disappearance, 
and subsequently death, of their 16 years old son who was 
employed as a jackaroo in Western Australia. In spite of 
received reassurance that the company would take care of 
their young boy who would always work under constant 
supervision, after only seven weeks in the job, he was 
sent to work on his own in an isolated property and he 
had gone missing. Two months latter his parents were 
informed about son’s disappearance and, when they heard 
the news, his father collapsed. After approximately five 
months of searching, in which the parents took part, their 
son’s remains were found in the desert. The High Court 
of Western Australia held that a duty of care was owed 
to the parents in respect of their psychiatric injury in the 
aftermath of their son’s disappearance.
3.  PRIMARY V SECONDARY VICTIM
From a legal view of point, it is apparent that the law of 
tort should be able to develop incrementally, as relevant 
law experts learn more about psychiatric damages and 
society recognises its debilitating consequences on the 
victim’s psyche. At the end of the spectrum is the view that 
psychiatric damages should not be treated any different 
from a physical injury to the person. Medical knowledge 
of psychiatric illnesses has advanced to a sufficient 
stage which will enable for a complete codification of 
liability for psychiatric damage either as a result of direct 
victimisation (primary victim), or the eye-witnessing, or 
hearing about the accident (secondary victim).
19 Spence v Percy (1991) 21 QLSJ 427.
20 Rhodes v Canadian National Railway (1990) 75 DLR 248.
21 Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CRL p.317.
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In a legal practice, the vast majority of claims for 
psychiatric illnesses concern damage sustained as a result 
of the perception of death, injury or danger to a person 
other than the claimant. This is usually due to a fear or 
uncertainty about the person’s injury or other outcomes 
of the accident involving the person who is a loved one to 
the claimant. The question arises as to whether recovery 
is, or should be, barred in other situations, for example 
when a psychiatric illness is brought about as a result 
of perception of physical danger to the plaintiff. While 
considered a liability in the Jaensch case for the shock-
induced psychiatric damage, Dean J stated that it will not 
arise unless:
The reasonably foreseeable psychiatric injury was sustained as 
a result of the death, injury or peril of someone other than the 
person whose carelessness is alleged to have caused an injury.
From a logical standpoint there is no sound reason why 
recovery is not applicable if it is medically proven that 
the plaintiff suffered psychiatric illness and that it was 
sustained as a result of the defendant’s negligence. 
Certainly, it is inconceivable that a court would consider a 
claim brought by the plaintiff who suffered a shock-related 
psychiatric illness as a result of an accident due entirely to 
his or her own fault. If a driver, for example, due to a lack 
of care killed a pedestrian he cannot claim “psychiatric 
damage” and sue the deceased for shock caused by the 
body smashing through the windscreen as a result of an 
impact. The Dean’s formula was that the victim’s shock 
arose as a result of the defendant negligently killing, 
injuring or endangering a third party and shock results 
not due to a fear for safety of that third party but from a 
realisation of what the defendant had done, or due to the 
perception of what would happen to the victim (plaintiff) 
if he or she had been in the third party’s position. 
In Harrison v State Government Insurance Office22, 
the plaintiff was a passenger driven by her husband 
who caused an accident due to his carelessness. The 
driver died as a result of the accident and his wife, albeit 
suffering a minor physical injury, sustained psychiatric 
illness caused by the trauma because of the accident and 
her husband’s death. The wife brought action against 
her husband’s insurer and the court held that it was 
impossible to separate the shock caused by death of 
her husband and trauma caused by the accident itself. 
This was notwithstanding that the nervous shock and 
the subsequently suffered psychiatric illness had been a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence following the death 
of her husband. Similar findings were held in the cases 
of Dwyer v Dwyer23 and the Kohn v State Government 
Insurance Commission24. 
However, it was quite interesting finding in the Rowe 
22 Harrison v State Government Insurance Office (1985) QLD SC.
23 Dwyer v Dwyer (1969) 90 WN.
24 Kohn v State Government Insurance Commission (1976) 15 SASR 
255.
v McCartney25 case in which the passenger (plaintiff) 
suffered a minor physical injury due to the driver’s 
negligence while driving the plaintiff’s car but sustained 
depressive neurosis neither from the perception of her 
own injury nor for witnessing the driver’s injury but from 
a sense of guilt because of the permission given to the 
driver, a quadriplegic, to drive her car. She failed in her 
claim for psychiatric damage on the grounds of the type 
of damage she sustained (guilt-induced neurosis). Similar 
findings were imposed in the Klug v Motor Accidents 
Insurance Board26 ruling that the plaintiff’s condition was 
the result of his irrational feeling of guilt.
From the abovementioned, it is obvious that limitations 
in claiming psychiatric damages for a secondary victim 
are quite obscure. It may be bound up in the concept of 
proximity or from the pure public policy consideration, or 
both. However, there is no logical or sound policy as to 
why recovery should be refused when the plaintiff suffers 
a psychiatric damage not from perception of the death 
or injury of a loved one, but from the realisation as to 
what would happen to the plaintiff if he or she was there, 
or in a ‘near miss’ situation. In these circumstances, the 
plaintiff’s psychiatric illness is not from perception of a 
narrow avoidance of death or injury to another but from 
realisation of his or her own fortune or misfortune. 
It was quite interesting observation by the House of 
Lords in the Johnston v NEI International Combustion 
where the claimant was rewarded recovery for psychiatric 
damage as he suffered clinical depression after he was 
informed that his pleural plaques indicated a significant 
exposure to asbestos and the risk of future disease. 
Lord Hoffman was of the opinion that, unlike anxiety 
considered in Hicks v Chief Constable of the South 
Yorkshire Police27, the psychiatric illness does constitute 
damage for the purpose of founding an action in 
negligence. His Lordship based his opinion by referencing 
the principles of Hatton v Sutherland28 and Barber v 
Somerset County Council29. The foreseeable event in 
the Johnston case was that the claimant would contract 
an asbestos-related disease. However, even if this did 
not occur, he had sustained a psychiatric illness caused 
by an apprehension – long-standing anticipatory fear of 
developing an asbestos related disease.
In Wilks v Haines30 the plaintiff was a dormitory 
supervisor at a school who organised a switch of her 
working shift so that she was not on duty at night as she 
was usually would have been. During the early hours, an 
intruder broke in and killed two of the three supervisors 
25 Rowe v McCartney  (1976) 2 NSWLR 72.
26 Klug v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (1991) Aust Torts Rep 
81-134.
27 Hicks v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police (1992) 2 All 
ER 65.
28 Hatton v Sutherland (2004) ICR 613.
29 Barber v Somerset County Council (2004) 1 WLR 1089.
30 Wilks v Haines (1991) Aust Torts Rep 81.
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on duty and injured the third. When told about the 
incident, the plaintiff suffered shock and consequently 
psychiatric illness not because of the death and injury 
to her workmates, but as a result of her ‘fortune’ as 
she had altered her shift pattern. Although her claim 
was struck out, the question remains if the requisite 
criterion necessary for the duty of care was present, and 
whether the plaintiff did in fact genuinely believe she 
suffered a compensable injury due to the defendant’s 
carelessness. On the other hand, in the Klug case, Oliver 
LJ was troubled with the restrictions and considered it 
fundamentally flawed from the standpoints of principle 
and logic: 
The limitations must be based upon policy rather than upon 
logic, for the suffering and shock... as it must be, on the 
combination of proximity and foreseeability, there is certainly 
no logical reason why a remedy should be denied in such a case.
4 .   E X I S T I N G  L AW  O F  TO R T  O N 
RECOVERY DUE TO A PSYCHIATRIC 
DAMAGE: THE ALCOCK CASE AND 
BEYOND
In numerous tort law cases, textbooks and law journals, 
the Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire has been 
considered as a “test case” which shows the differences 
in endorsement of psychiatric damage within the law 
of tort. Apart from the restricted policy approach due to 
the possibility of ‘floodgate liability’, this case created 
most public and professional interest than any other 
case in the English law of tort. The case examines the 
limits of the aftermath problem either upon the primary 
or secondary victim and proximity and it is related to 
the tragedy which occurred during a football match 
at Hillsborough31. Some of the plaintiffs were at the 
ground where the tragedy took place, others went to find 
their missing relatives, and in some cases they visited a 
temporary mortuary which had been set up. Some of the 
plaintiffs went to the local hospitals in search of their 
loved ones, and others simply waited at home watching 
TV, or listening the radio, in a hope of receiving some 
news. There were those who travelled to Sheffield (UK) 
to search for their loved ones, relatives or friends. With 
the strain of searching and with the agony of all the 
waiting, in all of these cases, it was simply the scale of 
31 During the football match at the Hillsborough stadium one part of 
the stadium collapsed and in a massive panic among the spectators 
96 people died and hundreds have been injured. The legal action was 
taken by friends and relatives of those caught in the crush, killed 
or injured, and case brought together a number of claims identified 
as representative of the different legal issues raised by the group of 
claims as a whole. For the purpose of the test case, it was presumed 
that the plaintiffs had suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a 
result of their experience (M Lunney, K Oliphant, Tort Law, Text and 
Materials, (4th edition, Oxford University Press 2010).
the disaster which prevented immediate contact with the 
dead or the injured.
The case was brought by 16 claimants who were 
relatives or friends of Hillsborough victims and sought 
damages for psychiatric illness, mainly for posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Psychiatric harm and causation were 
assumed for the purpose of witnessing, which centred 
the scope for recovery when the claimants were neither 
a parent nor spouse of an immediate victim, and whether 
the communication other that direct involvement could 
ground a claim. Any further claim applications not only in 
regard to the Hillsborough disaster would depend on the 
post factum (success or failure) of the Alcock case. 
At first  instance, nervous shock was deemed 
reasonably foreseeable in principle for claimants who 
witnessed the tragedy via a live TV broadcast but not 
for those who had been told of the disaster or heard live 
radio broadcasting and only later saw the events on TV 
news items. Watching the disaster live on TV was deemed 
close enough to “being there” to count as a medium of 
communication for the purposes of liability: 
The visual image... is all important. It is what is fed to the eyes... 
the instant effect upon the emotions and the lasting effect upon 
the memory.
The court emphasised that the “instant visual effect” 
inevitable caused distress and shock resulting in 
the development of recognisable psychiatric illness 
(compensable injury), mainly post-traumatic stress 
disorder. According to Hidden LJ, recovery was entitled 
to siblings but no to the other categories beyond parent or 
spouse as:
Once (the line) is extended to include brother or sister… it has 
reached the margin of what the process of logical progression 
would allow. The other relationships are not so immediate to 
make it reasonably foreseeable to a defendant that psychiatric 
illness, rather than grief and sorrow, would follow death or 
damage to the loved one.
However, the Alcock case questioned many things in 
relation to clarify the meaning of the “near”, “loved one” 
or “close” relatives in the scope of “extension” while 
considering the inclusion of brother or sister. The House 
of Lords held that there is a rebuttable presumption of 
sufficiently close ties of love and affection between 
spouses, parents and children, but in all other cases the 
closeness of the tie had to be proved by the plaintiff. 
However, one plaintiff had been present at the ground 
and witnessed the disaster in which his two brothers 
were killed, but his claim failed as he was “unable to 
produce evidence of a close tie of love and affection to 
his brothers”. In a subsequent case, psychiatric damages, 
however, were awarded to the half-brother of one of the 
Hillsborough victims because the judge found evidence 
that he was close to his half brother. Apart of inconsistence 
regarding the court requirement for “close tie of love and 
affection to the immediate victim”, the most puzzles are 
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how the plaintiff could provide reliability of such post 
mortem evidence.
In Turbyfield v Great Western Railway32 the twin sister 
was awarded for a shock, without any suggestion that she 
had a special status as a twin. More generally, there is no 
logic reason to exclude a fiancée, partner or grandparent 
considering proximity and/or close affection. This has in 
particular been considered in the McLaughlin v O’Brian 
case in which Lord Wilberforce stated that ‘near relative’ 
may recover and he did not accept a rigid application 
for proximity and rather emphasised a common sense to 
individual situations in their entirety. This is in particular 
in regard to the restrictive liability for ‘secondary’ 
claimants when the harm is reasonably foreseeable. The 
principle of proximity was the predominant issue in the 
Alcock case with a different approach and in the first 
instance it was the opinion that the ‘floodgate liability’ 
issue could compromise the claims. From the medical 
point of view, this approach was quite senseless and 
unacceptable – it is begs the question as to what could be 
a more horrific accident than the Hillsborough tragedy 
and why despite the horrible scenes with 96 killed people 
and hundreds injured, the ‘scale of horror’ had not been 
horrible enough for the court?!
In many cases before the Alcock it was clear that 
the claimant need not actually be at the scene of the 
accident (‘proximity in time and place’)33, in particular 
in the Australian case Jaensch v Coffey. This causes 
some theoretical question should proximity and liability 
for psychiatric damage depends on a race between the 
claimants and the ambulance or of the A&E waiting 
list and busy ward. In Galli-Atkinson v Seghal34, the 
claimant’s daughter was killed by a car which dangerously 
mounted the pavement. The claimant was looking for 
her, came to the police surrounding the accident, and was 
told that her daughter was dead. She then together with 
her husband went to the mortuary and saw her daughter’s 
dead body, which had devastating and disfiguring injuries. 
The court ruled that this constituted continued sequence 
of the traumatic event and that the accident’s immediate 
aftermath extended to the moment when the claimant left 
the mortuary. 
Needless to say that this decision could not be 
delivered by the court if ruled by the Alcock principle in 
which the relatives who travelled to Sheffield to search 
for loved one and subsequently identified their dead 
bodies in the temporary mortuary were not entitled to 
recover based on the aftermath doctrine. For Parker LJ in 
the Hillsborough case, there would be liability only if the 
plaintiff had to identify a body as part of the immediate 
32 Turbyfield v Great Western Railway (1937) 54 TLR 221.
33 See: Benson v Lee (1972) VR 879; Fenn v City Peterborough 
(1976) 73 DLR 177; McLaughlin v O’Brian (1983) 1 AC 410; 
Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR p.549.
34 Galli-Atkinson v Seghal (2003) EWCA Civ 697.
aftermath of the accident. This opinion contradicted 
the Hevican v Ruane35 case which was delivered only 
a few months before. In that case, the plaintiff suffered 
psychiatric illness as a result, inter alia, seeing the body 
of his dead son in the mortuary approximately three hours 
after he was killed in a bus accident, along with other 
members of his school football team.
Unlike the Hevican case, Parker LJ held a position that 
identification took place at about midnight, nearly nine 
hours after the tragedy occurred and ten or more hours 
after the gates were opened. Even in the aftermath at the 
hospital it was interpreted narrowly by Parker LJ stressing 
that this was to be regarded as part of the catastrophe 
“because none of the victims had been cleaned up or 
attended”. This opinion was quite controversial as 
suggests that if victims had received preliminary A&E 
treatment they could no longer be within the aftermath 
of the accident. However, it does not sound reasonable to 
exclude from a potential case of action from the victim’s 
relatives or friends due to the shock suffered seeing and 
knowing what had happened. The efficiency of the A&E 
treatment depends on many circumstances and it would be 
interesting to know application of the “aftermath doctrine” 
if the accident happened on a busy Saturday night, where 
treatment may be delayed for several hours. Clearly, 
the ‘aftermath’ cause should be taken more flexibly 
and longer than one or two hours as was suggested by 
McLaughlin. The House of Lords in the Alcock case 
have almost certainly limited the aftermath doctrine to a 
narrower scope than was accepted in the Jaensch case.
In Alcock,  the House of Lords recognised the 
proximity of relationship between parent, and spouses, 
but required ‘sufficiently close’ ties of love and affection 
to be proved in the case of other relatives or friends. This 
requirement did not provide directions how the claimant 
can produce the evidence of a “closeness” with the dead 
person, and what onus probandi for affection should be 
used considering that the affection is an implied feeling 
and emotion, and used to refer to love or positive feelings 
for another that are not sexual. Further difficulties in 
accepting principle from the Alcock in regard to proximity 
of perception is uncertainty about how much perception 
of the accident the claimant must experience to be 
compensatory. In Hambrook v Stokes Bros the claimant 
was awarded recovery because of having a reasonable fear 
for the life or safety of a loved one. It is quite difficult to 
find a reasonable explanation for dismissing the claim in 
Alcock for those claimants who “witnessed” the shocking 
scenes on live television or had been told that their loved 
one was killed or severely injured. 
As all roads lead to Rome, the House of Lords alluded 
to the most likely reason for the controversial decision in 
Alcock – the anticipatory fear of the “floodgate liability” 
35 Hevican v Ruane (1991) 3 All ER 65.
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applications. In the Page v Smith case, Lloyd LJ giving 
leading speech stated that:
… in cases involving nervous shock, it is essential to distinguish 
between the primary and secondary victims… in claims by 
secondary victims the law insists on certain control mechanisms, 
in order as a matter of policy to limit the number of potential 
claimants.
The House of Lords again considered “nervous shock” 
as the plaintiff was outside the range of foreseeable 
physical injury. The case was about a car crash in which 
the plaintiff was driving with due care when suddenly 
without warning the defendant who was coming from the 
opposite side caused the accident. The plaintiff did not 
suffer physical injuries but three hours later felt exhausted 
and such conditions continued such that he never fully 
recovered. At the time of appeal, almost eight years after 
the accident occurred, he still was not working and was 
diagnosed with a chronic myalgic encephalomyelitis. In 
the first instance, the plaintiff was awarded recovery but 
the defendant made an appeal on the grounds that it had 
not been reasonably foreseeable that the person of normal 
fortitude would suffer psychiatric damage without any 
physical injuries at the accident. 
5.  PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE IN THE LAW 
OF TORT AFTER THE ALCOCK CASE
Because of many similarities, it appears that White v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire36 was a “test case” in regard 
to the decisions delivered in Alcock. In this case, a number 
of police officers made applications for claim against 
their employer, the Chief Constable, in respect of post-
traumatic stress disorder suffered in the aftermath of the 
Hillsborough disaster. All of the police officers had been 
on duty at the stadium when the tragedy happened and 
took different roles in an attempt to help injured spectators 
and all of them had witnessed chaotic and horrible scenes. 
The court found that claim is entitled to succeed either on 
the basis that the officers had encountered exceptionally 
horrific scenes in the course of their employment or that 
they were rescuers. The case came in front of the House 
of Lords after the Chief Constable appealed against the 
finding and claims were rejected. Part of the reason for 
this was undoubtedly public policy – since all the claims 
for compensation by relatives of the victims had already 
been rejected in Alcock where the psychiatric injuries 
were not reasonable foreseeable, it could and did cause a 
public furore if police officers were compensated in less 
deserving cases.
The House of Lords found that plaintiffs in this 
case were rescuers by virtue of their employment not 
‘personally threatened’ or in relationship of love and 
affection with any of the deceased. Their Lordships 
36 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1999) 2 AC 455.
observed that there is no authority which decides that a 
rescuer is in any special position in relation to liability for 
a psychiatric injury. The White case questioned Chadwick 
v British Railways Board37, however, Lord Hoffman did 
not use principles from this case and Waller J’s judgement 
but rather logic from the Alcock case:
There does not seem to me to be any logical reason why the 
normal treatment of rescuers on the issues of foreseeability and 
causation should lead to the conclusion that, for the purpose 
of liability for psychiatric injury, they should be given special 
treatment as primary victims....
Unlike in the Alcock case where the plaintiffs were the 
secondary victims, in Page v Smith the plaintiff was 
the ‘participant’ of the defendant’s negligence, not a 
spectator or bystander. He was the primary victim with 
the foreseeability of physical injury but instead suffered 
psychiatric illness. The factual distinction between the 
primary and the secondary victim was recognised in 
Bourhill v Young38 where the plaintiff was not directly 
involved in the accident but after hearing the crash and 
seeing blood left on the roadway, she suffered the extreme 
shock of the occurrence, but also wrenched and injured 
her back. At the time of the accident she had been about 
eight months pregnant, and five weeks later she gave birth 
to a still-born child as a result of her injuries. The House 
of Lords found that she was observer who merely heard a 
noise of the actual accident and that defendant was under 
no duty to the plaintiff to foresee that his negligence in 
driving at an excessive speed and consequently causing an 
accident might result in injury to the plaintiff.
Observing the decision in Bourhill v Young, Lord 
Lloyd in Page v Smith stated that:
The secondary victim is almost always outside the area of 
physical impact, and therefore outside the range of foreseeable 
physical injury. But where the plaintiff is the primary victim of 
the defendant’s negligence, the nervous shock cases, by which 
I mean the cases following on from Bourhill v Young, are not in 
point.
His Lordship’s opinion challenged not only the decision 
in Bourhill v Young but tested the judgement delivered 
in the Alcock case in regard to the range of foreseeable 
physical injury. Albeit the condition of myalgic 
37 In Chadwick v British Railway Board [(1967) 1 WLR 912, an 
action was brought by the plaintiff as a personal representative of her 
late husband in respect of the injury she sustained as the aftermath of 
the Lewisham train disaster in 1957. In bad weather condition two 
trains collided and 90 people were killed. The accident happened 
at 6pm, some 200 yards from the Chadwicks’ house. Mr Chadwick 
immediately ran out to help and did rescue until 3am when he came 
home covered with mud and blood on his hands. He was shaking, 
upset and distressed, unable to sleep. The accident made him suffer 
psychiatric illness and he lost interest for previously enjoyable 
activities, and was unable to work. He required hospital treatment 
for approximately six months. Waller J held that the defendant 
owed the deceased a duty of care as a foreseeable victim of their 
negligence.
38 Bourhill v Young (1943) AC 92.
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encephalomyelitis is a neurological disease and not 
listed in the diagnostic manual (DSM-V or ICD-11) the 
symptoms can predominantly be seen as a psychiatric 
disorder. The House of Lords in the Page v Smith case 
adopted Lord Denning’s obiter dictum that “the test of 
liability for shock is foreseeability of injury by shock”39. 
Their Lordships found that the injury had to have been 
reasonably foreseeable in person of a normal fortitude, a 
requirement related to a minor accident in which no one 
had been physically injured. As in fact the plaintiff did not 
suffer physical injury as a direct aftermath of the accident, 
the finding in Page v Smith has been controversial in 
several aspects.
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  m y a l g i c 
encephalomyelitis could indicate the “ill-defined” nature 
of this medical condition itself with uncertainty about 
the causes, but the most controversial point is that such 
condition is not recognised as a “pure” or recognised 
psychiatric illness. Lord Lloyd’s finding received much 
criticism by Lord Goff in White case who described the 
decision in Page v Smith as “markedly departs from 
generally accepted principles”. We can summarise 
criticism into three categories: (a) there was no similar 
approach in any other case and there are cases quite 
contrary; (b) the approach that Lord Lloyd reached 
appears inconsistent with findings in the Wagon Mound40 
where a particular type of damage to property by fire was 
differentiated from other types of damage to property 
for the purpose of deciding whether the defendant could 
reasonable have foreseen damage of that particular type. 
Strict differentiation between psychiatric illness and 
physical injury is quite debatable and inconsistent with 
the scientific advances that psychiatric illnesses may 
have a physical basis, or that psychiatric injury should 
be regarded as another form of injury; (c) the majority in 
Page case may have misunderstanding the eggshell skull 
role – the rule that a tortfeasor cannot complain if the 
injuries he has caused turn out to be more serious than 
expected because his victim suffered from a pre-existing 
weakness, such as an unusual thin skull, and tortfeasor 
must take his victim as he finds him.
The Alcock case is still the subject of a number of 
academic as well as practical debates, and will occupy the 
attention of books and scientific journals, for quite some 
time before it is clearly defined and clarified. Mullany & 
Handford41 are of the opinion (contrary to the findings in 
Alcock) that the mental repercussions of traumatic event 
are more serious, are more deserving of the law’s attention 
than physical injury. The psychiatric illness frequently 
persists long after organic injuries have disappeared 
39 See Lord Denning in King v Phillips (1953) 1 QB 429.
40 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Ltd (The 
Wagon Mound No.2) (1967) 1 AC 617.
41 NJ Mullany, PR Handford, Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage, 
(The Law Book Company 1993).
and that the healing process is often more complicated 
due to severity and complexity of the symptoms of the 
mental disorder. This is particularly in delayed PTSD or 
in complex trauma followed by dissociation42. In clinical 
practice, it is common that the after-effects of trauma 
never fully dissipate and continue to haunt the traumatised 
individual for the remainder of his/her life, eroding 
continuity of the sense of self. However, the courts, such 
as in the Alcock case, create precedents irrespective of 
the medical findings as psychiatric illness is commonly 
unrelated to physical injury at the accident but can cause 
organic changes, even in blood cells, in case of severe 
trauma.
6.  PROBLEMS IN ACKNOWLEDGING 
THE PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE BETWEEN 
THE LAW AND THE MEDICINE
While considering recovery for “nervous shock” it 
is necessary to clarify the meanings of “recognisable 
psychiatric illness/injury” and endeavour to apply the 
contrasting approaches between the law and medicine. In 
medicine, the meaning of ‘emotional distress or suffering’ 
has not always been clearly and precisely defined43. While 
responding to the UK Law Commission in regard to the 
liability for diagnosable psychiatric illness44, the UK 
42 V Zepinic, Hidden Scars: Understanding and Treating Complex 
Trauma, Xlibris, 2011 (See also: V Zepinic: The Self and Complex 
Trauma, 2012; S Boon, The treatment of traumatic memories in 
DID, 1997; D Brown, et al., Memory, trauma treatment, and the 
law, 1998; JD Ford, et al., Treatment of complex posttraumatic 
self-dysregulation, 2005; JL Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 
1992; K Steel K, et al., Dependency in the treatment of complex 
posttraumatic stress disorder and dissociative disorder, 2001.
43 Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), one of the most common 
human reactions to traumatic event, has been differently defined 
with a variety of formulations by well-respected professionals in the 
field of psychotraumatology. Because of the presence of autonomic 
cardiac symptoms, this mental health condition was named soldier’s 
heart during the US civil war; in early 1900s because of influence 
of psychoanalysis the clinicians applied diagnosis of traumatic 
neurosis; in World War I the syndrome was called shell shock and 
was hypothesised to result from brain trauma by exploding shells; 
during World War II, as well as symptoms described by survivors 
of Nazi concentration camps and the survivors of the atomic 
bombings in Japan, the syndrome was called combat neurosis or 
operational fatigue; the psychiatric morbidity associated with 
Vietnam War veterans finally brought the concept of posttraumatic 
stress disorder being defined for the first time as an independent 
disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) published 
in 1980. In all these traumatic situations, the appearance of the 
disorder was roughly correlated with the severity and complexity of 
the stressor, and the most severe stresses resulted in the occurrence 
of the syndrome in more than 75 percent of the victims (See more 
details in: BJ Sadock, VA Sadock, Kaplan & Sadock’s Synopsis 
of Psychiatry, 9th ed, 2003; RE Hales, SC Yudofsky, JA Talbot, 
Textbook of Psychiatry, 3rd ed, 1999; M Gelder, R Mayou, P Cowen, 
Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, 2001); M Jones, Liability for 
Psychiatric Illness – More Principle, Less Subtlety, 1995.
44 UK Law Commission, No 249, Liability for Psychiatric Illness 
(HMSO 1998).
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Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Mental Health Law Group 
stated:
For psychiatrists the ‘shock-induced’ requirement causes serious 
problems. The term is vague, has no psychiatric meaning and is 
emotively misleading. The requirement should be abandoned... 
The requirement to fit the evidence around the concept of 
whether or not the disorder is “shock-induced” has no scientific 
or clinical merit45.
In recent years a significant proportion of claims for 
damages for psychiatric illness have specifically alleged 
that they have been suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder. It seems likely that the emphasis given to 
post-traumatic stress disorder stems from the courts 
requirement that the plaintiff prove that he or she is 
suffering from a shock-induced recognisable psychiatric 
illness as a result of the defendant’s negligence. It is 
conflicting to make distinction between “illness” and 
‘disease’ not only in the law of tort but even in general 
medicine as well. In general, “disease” refers to a defined 
morbid process having characteristic symptoms of the 
pathology. On the other hand, “illness” is defined as 
the appreciated dimensions of a medical condition, 
the subjective awareness of distress or limitation in 
functioning. Although these two often coexist or interplay, 
they are mutually exclusive concepts of impact upon the 
person. For example, a person may be diseased without 
being ill such as well-controlled diabetes; or being ill 
without having disease such as loss of limb as a result of 
an accident. 
The World Health Organisation defines “health” as 
“a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-
being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”. 
However, a majority of psychiatric conditions which are 
potentially the subject of tort claims are best regarded 
as “mental illness’ based on the presence of suffering. In 
practice, rather than struggle to find a global definition 
for the “mental illness”, psychiatrists allocate various 
psychiatric disorders to diagnostic categories designed 
to represent distinct entities, grouping collectively under 
the umbrella of the “mental illness”. However, in the 
case of “recognisable psychiatric illness” the law of 
tort does not accept terms such as “mental distress”, 
“emotional suffering”, “mental anguish’, or “emotional 
distress”, but assessed psychiatric illness in accordance 
with the diagnostic criteria, either prescribed by the 
DSM or ICD. It should also be stated that in medicine, 
the term “emotional” indicates a person’s mood or 
spirit (often a state of agitation or excitement), and the 
term “mental” indicates a psychological or psychiatric 
condition but not an exact psychiatric illness. In the US 
45 See also: WG Earengey, The Legal Consequences of Shock, 1992; 
RE Kendell, The distinction between mental and physical illness, 
2001; D Mendelson, The Interfaces of Medicine and Law, 1998; NJ 
Mullany, P Handford, Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage, 1993; 
C Tennant, Liability for Psychiatric Injury: an Evidence-based 
Approach, 2002; S Wessely, Liability for Psychiatric Illness, 1995. 
the courts adopted a practice of using the term “emotional 
distress” (and occasionally “mental distress”) to cover 
both initial emotional response to stimuli and the mental 
consequences of response. In the Commonwealth 
countries, however, the distinction between the two 
remains and, from the medico-legal point of view, it 
remains so in order to avoid the use of the terms “emotional 
distress” or “mental illness” while referring in the medico-
legal report to recognisable psychiatric illness. 
It is thus the best option covering a variety of 
unpleasant or detrimental emotional reactions universally 
accepted in recognisable psychiatric illness. This approach 
defines “emotion” as a multidimensional referent: (a) 
individual, consciously felt effect; (b) the complex set 
of biochemical processes which constitute the internal 
milieu in which multiple reactions take place at various 
physiological integration, as well as functioning of various 
neurological mechanisms (central or autonomic nervous 
system) related with the somatic expression of emotions; 
and (c) more or less typical apparent patterns of behaviour 
which express the felt effect to be manifested.
In general, there four basic human emotions: sadness46, 
joy47, anger48, and fear49. For a proper understanding of the 
emotions it is necessary to understand the nervous system 
and its anatomical and physiological distinctiveness. In 
Kline v Kline50, Gillett J described mental or emotional 
distress as “a touching of the mind, if not of the body”. 
This description is incorrect as not every type of 
emotional response is purely mental suffering. The general 
conclusion is that emotion as a purely mental thing does 
not exist. The bodily reactions are usually short-term, 
46 The emotions associated with sadness: defeated, dejected, 
depressed, despairing, desperate, devastated, disappointed, 
discouraged, embarrassed, guilty, helpless, hopeless, hurt, ignored, 
inadequate, incompetent, inferior, inhibited, insecure, isolated, 
lonely, melancholy, miserable, misunderstood, needy, pessimistic, 
preoccupied, pressured, regretful, rejected, remorseful, self-
conscious, shy, sorry, stupid, tired, trapped, troubled, unappreciated, 
unattractive, uncertain, uncomfortable, unfulfilled, useless, 
victimised, violated, vulnerable, weary, worried.
47 The emotions associated with joy: affectionate, alive, amused, 
beautiful, brave, calm, capable, caring, cheerful, cherished, 
comfortable, competent, concerned, confident, content, courageous, 
curious, delighted, desirable, eager, excited, forgiving, friendly, 
fulfilled, generous, giving, good, grateful, happy, hopeful, humorous, 
joyful, lovable, loved, loving, loyal, passionate, peaceful, playful, 
pleased, proud, quiet, relaxed, relieved, respected, safe, supportive, 
sympathetic, tender, thankful, thrilled, trusted, understanding, 
understood, unique, valuable, warm, wonderful, worthwhile, 
youthful.
48 The emotions associated with anger:  annoyed,  bi t ter, 
contemptuous, distrustful, enraged, furious, hateful, hostile, 
humiliated, hurt, impatient, irritated, outraged, overwhelmed, 
provoked, resentful, stubborn, touchy, unappreciated, uneasy.
49 The emotions associated with fear: afraid, apprehensive, ashamed, 
desperate, devastated, fearful, frantic, indecisive, helpless, hopeless, 
horrified, insecure, panicked, pressured, scared, self-destructive, 
self-hating, terrified, threatened, timid, trapped, uncertain, 
uncomfortable, victimised, violated, vulnerable.
50 Kline v Kline (1902) 64 NE 9.
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however, in the long-term these bodily changes may cause 
serious and permanent damage. It may be followed by a 
secondary, longer-term reaction, which occurs when the 
body cannot overcome the problem of emotional stress, 
or adequately cope with the traumatic event. Despite 
significant progress which has been made in psychiatric 
medicine, the line between “normal” emotional response 
to trauma and ‘abnormal’ is still unclear51. 
Complications to determine differences between 
normal and abnormal conditioning puzzle the courts 
in particular while distinguishing secondary damage 
from transitory or momentary human response (any 
injury, psychological or physical, taken by surprise or 
frightened). This was considered in Brook v Cook52 case 
when an African monkey suddenly appeared on top of 
the plaintiff’s garden wall, frightening her and she fell 
breaking her wrist. Similarly in Slatter v British Railways 
Board53 the plaintiff was startled by a loud bang caused 
by a loaded wagon crashing into a stationary wagon. In 
both of the abovementioned cases, the recovery from 
physical injury cannot be regarded as one involving 
recognisable psychiatric harm, albeit it was caused by 
immediate impact upon the plaintiff’s emotions resulting 
in uncontrollable reaction (behaviour) and physical injury. 
In essence, it was the initial response of exposure to 
trauma (as well as consequent and immediate physical 
injury) which may be classified as “emotional distress”. 
Trauma-induced disorder is the aftermath where a 
sufferer has been exposed to traumatic event(s) by the 
dread that all is not well, and that terrible is about to 
happen to him or those he loves. Because the person is 
afflicted, he does not know where the danger is going or 
coming from, his consistency is constantly under threat by 
the perceived need to worry even with no apparent reason. 
Such emotional tension produces severe stress resulting 
in severe symptoms such as nervousness and timidness, 
nausea, chest pressure, cardiac palpitations, shortness of 
breath, loss of weight, muscle spasm or pain, persistent 
headaches and backaches, stomach pains, weakness, and 
so on. It is also a common development of the conversion 
reactions into various physiological symptoms such as 
pain, muscular spasm, paralysis, mutism, and loss of 
hearing, or psychological blindness.
51 Freud argued that traumatic neurosis result when the ego is 
overwhelmed as a consequence of an extensive breach is made 
within defensive mechanisms (“protective shield”) against traumatic 
stimuli. The ego, seen as executive of the personality, mediates 
between the needs of the self and reality. In case of unbalanced 
ego function normal adaptive capabilities are disturbed and person 
reverts to the primitive form of defence known as repetition 
compulsion which involves repeating the distressing happening over 
and over. The active re-creation of the event in this manner rather 
than the passive experience of it as in the original situation allows 
trauma victim to overcome it. (See: S Freud, Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (Standard Edition 20, 1920).
52 Brook v Cook (1961) 105 SJ.
53 Slatter v British Railway Board (1966) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 395.
The effects of trauma do not manifest themselves 
only into recognisable psychiatric illness, but in terms of 
physical harm and chronic dysfunctions in some organs 
or parts of the body due to the overwhelming emotional 
reactions are purely psychological disturbances54. 
Somatoform complaints caused by the psychological 
factors are poorly understood by the law, but nevertheless 
by medicine as well. Traumatised individual may 
experience somatic sensations – feelings of coldness 
or hotness in the limbs, tingling, slight pains of a dull 
or sharp quality, feeling of fullness in the stomach, of 
distension in bladder or rectum, headaches or sensations of 
tightness or pressure on the head, etc. In severe traumatic 
cases, these symptoms may develop into somatoform 
dissociation – a condition which is characterised by (a) 
psychogenic symptoms, (b) causation is thought to be 
unconscious, and (c) occurs as a process of conversion or 
dissociation.
Alongside the somatoform problems, the effects of 
trauma manifest themselves in secondary reactions to the 
trauma: Hypochondria characterised by fear of illness 
and excessive concerns with the health; phobias which 
lead the traumatised individual to avoid contact with 
people or visit places or situations; obsessive-compulsive 
disorder leading people with continued appearance of 
unwelcomed ideas in the mind or a repeated urge to carry 
out certain acts or rituals; depressive reactions which 
cause sleeplessness, loss of appetite, impaired initiative 
and fatigue; hysterical reactions which affects sensory and 
motor system leading to possible loss of sensory capacities 
or partial paralysis (particularly in the extremities) and 
may also result in epileptic-like convulsions55. There have 
long been, and continue to be, widely diverging concepts 
of the psychiatric condition, making it the most difficult 
“recognisable psychiatric illness” to define and describe 
in the law of tort. 
Among all of the recognisable psychiatric illnesses, 
the particular significance belongs to post-traumatic 
54 V Zepinic, The Self and Complex Trauma (Xlibris Publishing 
2012). See also: MJ Friedman, (ed.) Handbook of PTSD, 2007; RR 
Grinker, LP Spiegel, Men Under Stress, 1945; MJ Horowitz, Stress 
Response Syndrome, 2001; A Kardiner, Traumatic Neurosis of War, 
1941; RS Lazarus RS, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process, 
1966; LJ Levenson LJ, (ed.) Textbook of Psychosomatic Medicine, 
2005; CS Myers, Shell Shock in France, 1916; ZV Segal, et al., The 
Self in Emotional Distress, 1993; O van der Hart, (ed.) The Haunted 
Self, 2009; BA van der Kolk, (ed.) Traumatic Stress, 1996.
55 See: SE Abbey, Somatisation and Somatoform Disorders, 2005; 
American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), 2012; M Aragona, et al., 
The relationship between somatisation and posttraumatic symptoms 
amongst immigrants receiving primary care services, 2010; C 
Archibald, et al., Persistent stress reactions after combat, 1965; 
JD Bremmer, et al., Functional neuroanatomical correlates of the 
effect of stress on memory, 1995; CV Ford, Somatic symptoms, 
somatisation, and traumatic stress: An overview, 1997; LJ Herman, 
Trauma and Recovery, 1992; W Katon, et al., Somatisation: A 
spectrum of severity, 1991. 
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stress disorder (PTSD), as the most present in the 
courtrooms. Although clinical features of the PTSD have 
been observed for hundreds of years, the psychiatric 
nomenclature of the disorder was for the first time defined 
in the early 1980s. It was in 1980 when the American 
psychiatrists introduced PTSD as a new diagnostic 
category in the DSM-III – standardised diagnostic 
psychiatric text. One catalyst for its inclusion was the 
growing research findings carried out on combat veterans, 
in particular the catastrophic condition of the Vietnam 
War veterans. 
Soon after PTSD had been recognised as a psychiatric 
illness in diagnostic manuals (DSM and ICD), the 
suffering of plaintiffs had been identified as recognisable 
psychiatric illness adopting diagnostic criteria56. The 
courts accepted that the PTSD is an aftermath of the 
exposure to a distressing external event which is outside 
the range of usual human experience. Importantly, the 
courts also recognised that trauma may be experienced 
through direct physical perception or on learning of it 
through third parties, alone or in the company of others.
Exposure to the phenomena of traumatic events lead to 
a characteristic collection of the symptoms including re-
experience of the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli 
associated with the trauma, numbing of responsiveness 
to the external world and increased arousal. All four 
criteria must be present to diagnose PTSD which focuses 
on specific psychological response to an extreme 
environmental condition which would evoke distress 
symptoms. In severe cases, the PTSD victims may 
even experience memory fragmentation, developing 
psychogenic amnesia for important aspects of the 
trauma. Trauma sufferers also experience problems in 
concentrating or completing tasks and display irregular 
aggressive or violent behaviour ranging from irritability, 
with fears of losing control, to unpredictable explosion of 
anger, to inability to express anger at all.
The original definition of PTSD includes a distinction 
between three subtypes: An acute disorder which began 
within six months of the trauma and lasted less than six 
months; a chronic disorder lasting six months or longer; 
and delayed PTSD which had its onset at least six months 
after the event occurred. Clinical experience reveals that 
PTSD is a syndromal progression of features from acute 
to the chronic stage, although it is certainly true that this 
progression may be affected by “secondary symptoms”, 
such as fatigue or tiredness due to involvement in 
continuing or progressive litigation.
Alongside the PTSD symptoms described in previous 
editions of the DSM, the fifth edition introduced 
new elements of the diagnostic criteria: dissociative 
56 See: Chapman v Lear [1984] QSC 3732; Clark v Criminal Code 
of QLS (1992) QSC 363; Pithworth v Bevan M Roberts Ltd (1992) 
SASC 770; Mullay v Bus Eireann (1991) Irish HC .
symptoms57. In general, dissociation is a severe condition 
of distorted self, sudden disruption or alteration of some 
aspect of consciousness, identity, or motor behaviour. 
It can be sudden or gradual in onset, and transient or 
chronic in duration. Dissociation evolves over time into 
a maladaptive or pathological process and dissociative 
phenomena which exist in a continuum58. How, as a matter 
of relativities and practicality, it should be accommodated 
in the law of tort general structure for redressing personal 
suffering due to dissociation is difficult to say as the law 
is far from uniform in classifying and providing remedies 
for mental and emotional harm. The law is, in many 
aspects, imprecise and slow in adopting novel approaches 
in the medicine, in particular as medical opinions differ 
on how to define and label particular mental conditions. It 
is also apparent that with the differences within the same 
category of law, comparable legal system has adopted 
divergent rules and terminology for mental harm, such as 
‘emotional distress’ in the US jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this article has served to illustrate the 
complexity for both the law of tort and medicine to foster 
the imposition of inappropriate doctrinal restrictions on 
recovery for psychiatric damages and the influence of 
underlying concerns that continue to create uncertainty in 
this grey area. Damage to the psyche has throughout the 
history provoked apprehension, a sense uncertainty, and 
ignorance, as these injuries cannot be seen by the naked 
57  DSM-V diagnostic criteria for PTSD require specifying whether 
the disorder is with dissociative symptoms. The individual’s 
symptoms meet the criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder, and 
in addition, in response to the stressor, the individual experiences 
persistent or recurrent symptoms of either of the following:
1.  Depersonalisation: Persistent or recurrent experiences of feeling 
detached from, and as if one were an outside observer of, one’s 
mental processes or body (e.g., feeling as though one were in 
a dream: feeling a sense of unreality of self or body or of time 
moving slowly).
2. Derealisation: Persistent or recurrent experiences of unreality of 
surroundings (e.g., the world around the individual is experienced 
as unreal, dreamlike, distant, or distorted).
58 For more details about pathology, symptoms complexity and 
severity of dissociation see: Bernstein EM: Development, reliability, 
and validity of a dissociation scale, 1986; Branscomb LP: 
Dissociation in combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder, 1992; 
JD Bremner, Trauma, Memory, and Dissociation, 1997; J Briere, 
Peritraumatic and persistent dissociation in the presumed aetiology 
of PTSD, 2005; PF Deli, (ed.) Dissociation and the Dissociative 
Disorder, 2009; NC Feeny, Anger, dissociation, and posttraumatic 
stress disorder among female assault victims, 2000; AM Ludwig, 
The psychobiological functions of dissociation, 1983; ERS 
Nijenhuis, Somatoform Dissociation: Phenomena, Measurement, 
and Theoretical Issues, 2004; FW Putnam, Development of 
Dissociative Disorder, 1995; O van der Hart, (ed.) Trauma-related 
dissociation: Conceptual clarity lost and found, 2004; V Zepinic, 
Healing traumatic memories: A case study, 2008; v Zepinic: The 
Self and Complex Trauma, 2012; C Zlotnik, et al., Chronicity in 
posttraumatic stress disorder and predictors of course of comorbid 
PTSD in patients with anxiety disorder, 1999. 
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eye. However, it does not mean that psychiatric injury 
is any “less real” than physical injury which involve 
broken bones, the spilling of blood, the scarring of tissues 
or “physical” pain. In fact, the repercussions of trauma 
are more serious, more deserving of the law’s attention 
than those of a physical nature. In many clinical cases is 
evident that the trauma is analogues to a high-velocity 
bullet piercing through the body, tearing apart internal 
organs which are critical for survival. As aftermath of the 
traumatic event(s) the suffering frequently persists long 
after the physical injuries have disappeared. Despite its 
history and movements forward, psychiatric damage in 
the law of tort is still a subject of development and in its 
embryonic stage and not clearly defined academically nor 
practically. It was not surprise that the Coultas decision 
was challenged by the courts in Ireland, UK, USA, 
South Africa, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. This 
was particularly evident since 1980 when PTSD was 
recognised as an independent disorder by the DSM-III and 
steadily increasing knowledge of the effect on the human 
psyche by traumatic event(s). The law started to march 
with the medicine the same beat but in the reality it is 
little limping. 
The Alcock case illustrates the court reluctance 
to acknowledge the individual’s suffering due to the 
influence of underlying concerns that recovery will open 
the window for “floodgate of liability”. The decision 
has widened a gap between the law and the medicine 
and, in terms of doctrinal maturation, acknowledgment 
of psychiatric damage into the law of tort, after over a 
century, it is still in its embryonic stages. Given the legal 
requirements of a recognisable psychiatric illness, the 
law of tort is faced with this dilemma and uncertainty 
about the issue: To adopt unreservedly medical progress 
in assessing and diagnosing psychiatric illnesses or to 
follow the policy of limitations due to a fear of ‘floodgate 
claims’. Considering this, it is worthwhile to mention 
the opinion expressed by the UK Association of Personal 
Injury Lawyers that:
It would be inequitable for people who have suffered a 
recognised psychiatric illness to be denied the damages to which 
they are entitled due to an erroneous public policy aiming to 
prevent a mythical eventuality59.
Some of the most outspoken critics, which include a call 
for the law reform for recovery of psychiatric damage, 
was given by Southin J in McDermott v Ramadanovic 
Estate60:
What is logical difference between a scar on the flesh and a scar 
on the mind? If a scar on the flesh is compensable although it 
causes no pecuniary loss, why should a scar on the mind be any 
less compensable? 
59 Association of Personal Injury Lawyers: The Law on Damages: A 
Response by the Association of the Personal Injury Lawyers, 2007.
60 McDermott v Ramadanovic Estate (1988)] 27 BCLR (2nd) 45.
It seems that kinds of personal harms should not be treated 
differently in regard to the rules governing responsibility 
at law: The right to recover for psychiatric damage should 
not be subject to the relationship of the mentally disturbed 
person to the primary victim or whether he or she was 
present at the accident or its aftermath, news of distressing 
event was communicated by a third party or via modern 
media, the particular form of psychiatric complaint was 
shock-induced or developed rapidly or gradually, was 
lengthy in duration or short-lived or attributable to factors 
other than an accident to another or sensitivity to damage to 
the mind61. The law cannot persist in ignoring the valuable 
findings and contributions made by other disciplines in the 
formulation and development of the common law. 
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